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Abstract 
 
We study the effect of cultural differences on contributions in a public good 
experiment, analysing real-time interactions between Italian and British subjects in their 
home countries. In the first treatment, subjects play in nationally-homogeneous groups. 
In the second treatment, Italian and British subjects play in heterogeneous groups, 
knowing the nationality of the group members. In the third treatment, we control for a 
possible “country effect” by giving players no information on nationality. The data 
suggest that, in homogeneous groups, British subjects contribute significantly more to 
the public good; contributions are lower in heterogeneous groups; there is no country 
effect. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The hypothesis that cultural background1 matters for economic interaction has 
frequently been tested and generally confirmed in various cross-cultural economics 
experiments. For instance, Roth et al. (1991), Kachelmeier and Shehata (1992), Croson 
and Buchan (1999) identify the potential role of different cultural norms in influencing 
economic outcomes in the case of a bargaining framework. In an ultimatum game, Roth 
et al. (1991), Munier and Zaharia (1998), Henrich et al. (2001), Oosterbeek et al. (2001) 
find clear differences in proposer and responder behaviour across countries. Ockenfels 
and Weimann (1999) run public goods and solidarity experiments, finding that in both 
games Eastern German subjects are more selfish than Western German subjects. Cason 
et al. (2002) find that the contribution levels between American and Japanese subjects 
are significantly different. Gaechter et al. (2003) show that strong cultural differences 
emerge when subjects have the possibility to punish the other members of their groups.2 
Whereas these cross-cultural experiments have been fruitful in stimulating a 
large number of important contributions in the field, experimentalists have paid far less 
attention to the study of heterogeneous groups of subjects with different cultural 
backgrounds. In many economic interactions, the various cultural backgrounds of the 
players involved will be known, such as in international issues of trade, aid and the 
environment. Therefore, it is not only significant to compare homogenous groups; it is 
also important to know how subjects behave when they are aware that they play in a 
group composed of both country A and country B subjects. Some studies addressed this 
                                                 
1 Culture is difficult to univocally define. Richerson and Boyd (2005) suggest that culture is “information 
capable of affecting individuals’ behaviour that they acquire from other members of their species through 
teaching, imitation, and other forms of social transmission”. 
2 In contrast with previous studies, Brandts et al. (2004) find minor differences in the contributions to 
public goods between Holland, Spain, Japan and USA. Also, in auctions and fair division games, 
Ivanova-Stenzel (2001) reports no differences in individual bidding behaviour between Bulgaria and 
Germany. 
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question. Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) study different aspects of ethnic discrimination 
in Israeli Jewish society towards subjects of Eastern origin using trust, dictator, and 
ultimatum games. Carpenter and Cardenas (2004), observe the occurrence of different 
individual extraction decisions between American and Colombian subjects in a 
common pool resource game. In the trust-game experiments by Willinger et al. (2004), 
higher levels of investment are observed for German subjects when compared to 
French. Chuah et al. (forthcoming) report on the cultural differences between the 
behavior of Malaysian Chinese and UK subjects interacting within their own national 
groups, and with members of the other group in ultimatum game experiments . 
This paper studies the effects of interactions between Italian and British subjects 
on contributions to public goods. We compare the behaviour of groups formed by 
subjects of the same nationality but also consider the behaviour of mixed groups of 
British and Italian subjects. Our cross-country experiment considers two Western 
European countries (England and Italy), which we believe to diverge with respect to 
some important social variables. In section 2.1, we discuss evidence for cultural 
differences between these two countries. 
A novel aspect of our experiments is that they are conducted in real time in the 
two countries without the intervention of the experimenters. Independently of this 
study, Eckel and Wilson (2006) have carried out the only other real-time experiment. 
They report the results of experiments on trust games conducted over the internet 
between two different laboratories both in the USA. By contrast, in the papers cited 
above, the interaction between subjects of different nationalities is carried out indirectly 
through the intervention of the experimenter. A second novelty is that we control for a 
possible “country effect” by letting subjects play with foreign group members also 
without information on their nationality. This treatment is important because a 
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particular historical relationship or general prejudice between the chosen countries 
could influence the experimental evidence (see e.g. Fershtman and Gneezy, 2001).  
All our treatments are based on standard linear public-good games (or voluntary 
contribution mechanisms). In the first treatment (labelled “Native”), subjects are aware 
that they play in groups formed by compatriots. This represents our baseline treatment. 
In the second treatment (labelled “Italy–UK”), heterogeneous groups (two Italians and 
two Britons each), interact from labs sited in their home countries. Each subject knows 
the composition of the group in terms of proportion and nationality. The third treatment 
(labelled “Foreigner”) is the same as the Italy–UK treatment except for the information 
given to subjects: each player knows that one member of the group is a compatriot and 
that the other two are foreigners.  
The design allows us to test two hypotheses. (1) British subjects cooperate less 
than Italians in homogeneous groups (as suggested by the results in Burlando and Hey, 
1997, see below), and (2) subjects playing in heterogeneous groups cooperate less than 
those in homogenous groups (as suggested by Tajfel and Turner, 1979; McPherson et 
al. 2001; Ruffle and Sosis, 2004). In addition to these hypotheses, we use the 
comparison between the Italy–UK and Foreigner treatments as a control for a possible 
“country effect” due to possible attitudinal issues between Italian and British subjects.  
Our data reject the hypothesis that British subjects contribute less to the public 
good than Italians when playing in homogeneous groups. To the contrary, Britons 
contribute more when groups are made of compatriots. This was also the case in the 
Foreigner treatment whereas, in the Italy–UK treatments, it turns out that there are no 
significant differences between the contributions of British and Italian subjects. The 
second hypothesis is confirmed by the data. Subjects significantly lower their 
contributions to the public good in both Italy–UK and Foreigner treatments compared 
 6
with the Native treatment. Finally, we do not find any evidence of a country effect when 
comparing the contribution levels reached in Italy–UK and Foreigner treatments.  
The only previous experimental study testing for cultural differences between 
Italy and England is the abovementioned Burlando and Hey (1997), henceforth BH. BH 
do not analyze heterogeneous groups but their cross-country comparison suggests that 
British players free-ride significantly more than Italians in a public bad game. While 
this supports the hypothesis of different social norms in different social and cultural 
contests, it contradicts our results. Although our experiment differs from BH in many 
respects,3 we believe that only one of these differences is likely to explain why we 
obtain the opposite result. In our Native treatment, subjects know they are playing with 
compatriots only; it is not clear if the same was the case in BH. In section 3.2 we will 
discuss evidence for the effects of group heterogeneity on subjects’ interactions. 
 
 
2. Methodology 
 
 
2.1 Country Selection  
The choice of Italy and UK is supported by empirical studies analysing the role 
of cultural traits on the political and economic performance of different countries4. For 
example, Guiso et al. (2004) report the results of a recent survey conducted on 1,016 
managers from the five major EU countries. Each was asked to rank colleagues from 
                                                 
3 First, while we implement a linear public good game, BH opt for a public bad game. Second, BH allow 
for the price of the public bad to vary from round to round to motivate subjects to consider their decisions 
wisely; our marginal per capita return from the contribution to the public good is constant throughout the 
experiment. Third, each BH session involves two sub-sessions in order to check for a restart effect; our 
design does not have the same feature. Fourth, BH warn against potential differences in the purchasing 
power of the sums earned by British and Italian subjects; we resolved this problem by applying the Big 
Mac index to equalize the profits. 
4 The role of cultural factors as casual variables affecting the economic growth and development is also 
investigated from a theoretical point of view (Becker, 1998; Altman, 2001). 
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the five countries in terms of their trustworthiness.5 While British managers ranked 
fellow citizens as the most trustworthy and Italians the least, Italian managers ranked 
fellow citizens fourth in trustworthiness and British managers third. Therefore, that the 
expectations of agents correspond to the objective characteristics of the country seems 
to be upheld.  
Inglehart (2000) allocates sixty-five countries into distinct cultural zones 
according to different dimensions. A first classification is done following two cultural 
dimensions that reflect “cross-national polarization between traditional versus secular-
rational orientations toward authority and survival versus self-expression values” (p. 
82).6 Italy and Britain score the same value of the first cultural dimension but strongly 
diverge on the value of the second cultural dimension. In particular, Britain shows a 
much higher level of values of self-expression than Italy. Inglehart (2000) also analyses 
the coherence of the cultural clusters, examining the relationship between interpersonal 
trust7 and per capita GNP. Whereas Italy and Britain show very similar values of GNP 
per capita, there is a clear difference in those regarding interpersonal trust. Britain 
scores significantly higher than Italy in this cultural dimension, confirming a difference 
in social norms between these two countries.  
Along the same line, Hofstede (1996) studies how national differences relate to 
organizational practices. He uses data from a survey of IBM employees in fifty 
countries and three regions, constructing six groups on the basis of similarity along two 
                                                 
5 Managers ranked their colleagues on a scale from 1 to 5, where 1 is the highest level of trustworthiness 
and 5 the lowest. 
6 The former refers to the contrast between societies where factors such as religion, family ties, deference 
to authority and avoidance of political conflict are or are not important. The latter refers to the contrast 
between societies that emphasize survival values and those that show “low levels of subjective well-
being, report relatively poor health, low interpersonal trust, [and] intolerance toward outgroups” (p.84). 
7 Putnam (1993), Fukuyama (1995), Knack and Keefer (1997), and other scholars argue that 
interpersonal trust is crucial for building the social structures on which democratic societies and social 
organizations are based.  
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dimensions. The first dimension is the power distance, defined as "the extent to which 
the less powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and 
accept that power is distributed unequally" (p. 28). The second dimension measures the 
degree of individualism in a society, where individualism "pertains to societies in which 
the ties between individuals are loose: everyone is expected to look after himself or 
herself and his or her immediate family" (p. 51). According to this analysis, Italy and 
Britain belong to two different groups. In particular, Italy shows a higher power 
distance index and a lower individualism index than Britain. Therefore, we believe that 
the different levels of the social dimensions described above may affect the choices of 
the subjects taking part in a cross-cultural experiment. 
 
2.2 Design Issues 
 Roth et al. (1991) and Camerer (2003) list the methodological problems that 
may arise when running cross-country experiments, such as the experimenter effect, the 
language effect, and the currency effect.8 The first problem to solve is the presence of 
different experimenters in different locations, which may cause uncontrolled procedural 
or personal differences among the experimenters. To take care of this feature, all of our 
experimenters agreed upon the same experimental procedures and then ran initial 
sessions jointly (in Italy). We could thus be sure that all the experimenters followed the 
same procedures in the two labs.  
The second problem is given by the fact that the instructions had to be in two 
languages. To control for errors in translation (and given that the native language of the 
author is the Italian), we checked the accuracy of the instructions for British subjects by 
                                                 
8 Camerer (2003) suggests that care should be taken to avoid having samples that vary in representation 
of population from one country to another. Unfortunately, we do not have all the demographic data 
required to control for this effect. 
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having the author and two other Italian native-speakers independently translate the 
instructions into English. The three versions were then examined by an English native 
speaker to check for differences and correct for possible misinterpretation. The best of 
these three was used in the experiment.  
We then took into account differences in payments to subjects because of 
currency differences. Along with using the current exchange rate between the Euro and 
GBP,9 we controlled for differences in purchasing power between Italy and Britain by 
using the Economist’s Big Mac index. The latter measures did not differ significantly.  
We also needed a procedure to ensure the nationality of subjects recruited. 
Whereas virtually all students in Italy are Italian (and all participants were indeed 
Italian), the UK has a high concentration of international students. We decided not to 
pose a direct question regarding nationality because it might bias the experiment or 
raise nationalistic emotions. Instead, we issued a short, mandatory questionnaire with 
the e-mail announcing the experiment in which we “hide” the question of nationality 
among other demographical and academic-related questions.  
A further methodological aspect was given by the degree of directness and 
instantaneousness of interactions between subjects playing from different countries. In 
all previous experiments (to the best of our knowledge), the decisions of the sub-sample 
have been collected and sent by the experimenter to the other lab via the Internet, 
whereupon the second experimenter communicates them to the participants. In our 
study, we allow subjects to receive the feedback of the foreign sub-sample without 
experimenter intervention. 
Recently, Eckel and Wilson (2006) investigated the levels and the effects of 
subject’s scepticism towards being matched with another person playing from a 
                                                 
9 The exchange rate at that time was £1.00 = €1.40 (or €1.00 = £0.72). 
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different laboratory, when the experiment is conducted in real time over the internet 
(credibility issue). In a trust game, Eckel and Wilson (2006) show that, if subjects do 
not believe they are matched with a real person, the results may be misleading because 
subjects trust the experimenter rather than their partner. Unfortunately, we were not 
aware of this study and the potential problem when we ran the experiments. However, 
during informal debriefings after the sessions, several subjects asked the experimenters 
about the exact location of the other laboratory in both Foreigner and Italy–UK 
treatments. This may indicate some level of trust in their partners.        
 
3. Experimental Design and Hypotheses 
 
 
3.1 The Design 
All treatments use the same standard public good game. Four subjects are 
endowed with six tokens each. They decide on the allocation of their endowment 
between a private good, A (xi), and a public good B (gi). Each token placed in A (xi) 
earns one unit of Experimental Currency (EC) for the subject. Each token allocated to B 
(gi) gives 0.3 gi to each member of the group. Accordingly, each subject gets the 
following payoff: 
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Players receive feedback on their own contributions and their group’s contribution to 
the public good in each period.  
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Our experimental setting involves three treatments, each of them played for ten 
periods. We implemented a fixed matching protocol. The Native treatment is our 
control treatment. In this case, subjects know that they play in a group comprising only 
compatriots. The Italy–UK treatment divides participants into mixed groups of two 
Italian and two British players. The composition of the group remains the same during 
the ten periods and subjects know both the composition of the group and the 
nationalities involved. Subjects play from labs sited in their own country and interact 
with other group members in real time. Finally, the Foreigner treatment is organised the 
same way as the Italy–UK treatment except that subjects do not know the nationality of 
the foreign participants. 
The experiment was conducted at the University of Catania (Italy) and at Royal 
Holloway, University of London (UK). A total of 136 subjects, equally divided between 
Italian and British, were recruited among a population of students from a wide range of 
fields such as economics, law, political science, mathematics, and the arts. Each student 
participated in only one session of our experiment. For each treatment we ran two 
sessions. We obtained ten independent observations from forty subjects participating in 
the Native treatment and twelve independent observations for each treatment from 
ninety-six subjects in the Italy–UK and Foreigner treatments. 
Before beginning the experiment, the instructions were read aloud and explained 
in detail.10 Communication of any kind was forbidden. Subjects typed their decisions 
directly into their computers at their leisure. The staff of the Centro Informazione 
Giuridica at the University of Catania developed the experimental software. At the end 
of each treatment, subjects were paid anonymously and in cash at the following 
                                                 
10 See appendix for instructions of the Italy-UK treatment for British subjects.  
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exchange rates: 1EC = €0.20 = £0.14. On average, Italian subjects earned €14.45 and 
British subjects earned £10.40. Each treatment lasted between forty and sixty minutes. 
 
3.2 Hypotheses 
According to the standard game-theoretic approach, in each period fully rational 
subjects should be playing the free-riding strategy independent of location and the 
presence of group members of a different nationality. From many economic studies on 
individuals’ interactions, however, we know that subjects usually deviate from the Nash 
equilibrium. On this basis, we test for two hypotheses.  
 
Hypothesis 1. In homogeneous groups, British subjects contribute less than 
Italian subjects. 
 
This is based on BH’s results stating that British subjects are less cooperative than 
Italians in a public bad experiment. By comparing the levels of cooperation between the 
sessions of the Native treatment, we can confirm or deny those results. Moreover, we 
test the same hypothesis in the case of heterogeneous groups. We do this by comparing 
the contribution levels reached by the two national samples in the Italy–UK and 
Foreigner treatments, respectively.  
 
Hypothesis 2. Participants in heterogeneous groups contribute less than those in 
homogeneous groups.  
 
This is based on the results of several studies analyzing the negative influence of 
heterogeneous groups on subjects’ interactions. For instance, even if participants have a 
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mutual interest in coordinating their activities, this process may become more difficult 
when cross-cultural interactions take place (Chuah et al., 2004). As suggested by Tajfel 
and Turner (1979), a decrease in cooperation may be due to the effects of social 
categorisation and stereotyping. Subjects with similar cultural backgrounds and similar 
appearances tend to trust each other more (McPherson et al. 2001). Moreover, people 
may discriminate in favour of in-group members and at the expense of out-group 
members (Sherif, 1966; Ruffle and Sosis, 2004).11 Support for the influence of cultural 
differences on individuals’ behaviour has also come from cross-cultural communication 
and psychology literature, suggesting that people behave differently with members of 
their own culture vis-à-vis members of foreign cultures (Bouchner and Perks, 1971; 
Bouchner and Osako, 1977), and from business studies providing evidence that business 
negotiators adapt their behaviour in cross-cultural interactions compared with culturally 
homogeneous interactions (Adler and Graham, 1989).  
In addition to the previous hypotheses, we also check for the presence of a 
country effect between Italian and British subjects due to a particular attitude towards 
each other. If this is indeed the case, we should observe a difference in the contribution 
levels when comparing the Italy–UK and Foreigner treatments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
11 To this extent, in our experiment, subjects cannot perfectly discriminate between in-group and out-
group members. However, knowing that they are playing with either two foreigners or two 
Italians/Britons may still be enough to observe a decrease in cooperation, albeit to a lesser degree than in 
the above-mentioned papers. 
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4. The Results 
 
4.1 Nationality and Public Good Contributions 
Table 1 shows the average group contributions to the public good for each 
treatment, pooling the data from the two national samples. Each treatment starts at a 
quite high level of contribution, between 63.33 percent (Native) and 46.53 percent 
(Italy–UK), and ends significantly12 away from the Nash equilibrium of zero 
contribution, between 35 percent (Native) and 20.83 percent (Italy–UK).13 We also 
analyse the time trend for each treatment and find significant and decreasing patterns 
(Pearson correlation test, two-tailed, p=0.01).14 In the following we analyse the 
experimental results with respect to the two hypotheses formulated in the previous 
section. 
 
Table 1: Average Group Contribution as Percentage of Endowment  
Treatment 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Average
            
Native 
(10 groups of 4 
Subjects) 
63.33 69.92 62.50 56.57 56.57 60.83 43.75 48.33 42.08 35.00 54.79 
            
Italy–UK 
(12 groups of 4 
Subjects) 
46.88 46.53 43.75 45.49 42.36 32.64 32.99 27.43 25.59 20.83 36.46 
            
Foreigner 
(12 groups of 4 
Subjects) 
57.64 50.35 46.53 40.63 32.64 37.85 57.15 37.15 32.64 20.51 40.21 
 
 
                                                 
12 We run a simple OLS regression for each treatment with the individual contributions to the public 
good as dependent variable and with robust standard errors (White, 1980). In all three cases, the 
coefficients are significantly different from zero at the 1% level. We also adopted a censored Tobit 
regression in order to test the robustness of the results. Regardless of the specification used, our results 
proved to be robust in terms of sign, magnitude and statistical significance of the coefficients. 
13 Note that those levels of cooperation are perfectly in line with other experimental results on public 
goods (see Ledyard, 1995; Davis and Holt, 1993).  
14 The Spearman’s rho values for each treatment are rhoItaly-UK=-0.98, rhoForeigner=-0.97, rhoNative=-0.90, 
respectively. 
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 Hypothesis 1 states that British subjects contribute less than Italians when 
playing in homogeneous groups. Figure 1 shows that this hypothesis is rejected. In fact, 
aggregating the levels of contribution made by the two national samples in each 
treatment, we observe that British values are always higher than the Italian ones, the 
only exception being the Italy–UK treatment, where the two samples reach the same 
level. A similar result is shown in figures 2 and 3. In all periods but the last, Britons 
contribute more than Italians. By comparing the patterns of contribution to the public 
good achieved in the Italian and British sessions of the Native treatment, the non-
parametric Mann–Whitney U test (MWU) finds significant differences (p=0.049). In 
addition, we test the same hypothesis separately in both Italy–UK and Foreigner 
treatments. In Italy–UK, we do not find any significant difference between the 
contribution levels reached by British and Italian subjects. In Foreigner, the 
contributions made by the two national samples differ at a significance level of 10 
percent.15  
The results from the Native treatment confirm the effects of cultural differences 
on the individual contributions to the public good16, as shown in several papers on 
cross-country comparisons with public good experiments (Ockenfels and Weimann, 
1999; Cason et al., 2002; Gaechter et al., 2003). This overturns the findings of BH 
(1997) showing that British players free-ride significantly more than Italians. We 
summarize the results as follows 
 
                                                 
15 Given that in both the Italy-UK and Foreigner treatments pairs of different nationalities interact with 
each other, the appropriate test is the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test. The p-values referring to the WSR test 
are, respectively, pItaly-UK=0.77 and pForeigner=0.09.  
16 Although, our paper does not investigate whether potential different behaviour across groups within a 
country may be as large, or even larger, than the differences between the two countries, we acknowledge 
this possibility. The effects of such a result are described by Gerxhani and Schram (forthcoming). 
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Observation 1. In homogeneous groups, British subjects contribute significantly 
more than Italians. Moreover, when British subjects play in heterogeneous groups 
knowing that one member of each group is a compatriot and the other two are 
foreigners, they also contribute significantly more than Italians. By contrast, when 
subjects play in heterogeneous groups knowing the nationality of the group members, 
there are no significant differences in the contribution levels between the national 
samples.   
 
Figure 1: Average Contributions in Each Treatment 
 
  
According to hypothesis 2, subjects playing in heterogeneous groups should 
free-ride more than in the case of homogeneous groups. Figures 2 and 3 show that, 
regardless of nationality, the contributions in the Native treatment are always higher 
than in the other two treatments. Thus, hypothesis 2 is confirmed by our data. At the 
aggregate level, the contributions made in the Native treatment are significantly higher 
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than in both Italy–UK (p=0.008) and Foreigner treatments (p=0.009).17 At the same 
time, the MWU test does not find any difference between the Italy–UK and Foreigner 
treatments (p=0.53). Using the Italian and the British subsamples separately, these 
results are confirmed in that there are still significant differences between the Native 
treatment on the one hand and  the Italy–UK and Foreigner treatments on the other hand 
(all p<0.01) Our results confirm the negative influence of heterogeneous groups on 
subjects’ interactions.  
We then compare our findings to the stream of literature analysing the effects of 
cultural and social backgrounds on cooperation levels (Sherif, 1966; Tajfel and Turner, 
1979; McPherson et al., 2001; Ruffle and Sosis, 2004; Chuah et al., 2004). In particular, 
our results confirm the previous experimental findings on individuals’ behaviour in 
heterogeneous groups such as Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), which show the levels of 
ethnic discrimination in Israeli Jewish society; Willinger at al. (2004), which find 
different choices between German and French subjects; Carpenter and Cardenas (2004), 
who observe significant differences only between individual extraction decisions; and 
Chuah et al. (forthcoming), which note cultural differences between the behaviour of 
Malaysian and UK subjects. We summarize the result as follows: 
 
Observation 2. Regardless of nationality, subjects participating in heterogeneous 
groups contribute significantly less than members of homogeneous groups.  
 
 
 
 Figure 2: Average Contributions in Each Treatment 
                                                 
17 All the p-values represent the results of 2-tailed Mann-Whitney U test. 
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Finally, we control for a potential country effect by comparing the contribution 
levels reached in the Italy–UK and Foreigner treatments. Figures 2 and 3 show that it is 
not possible to distinguish between Italy–UK and Foreigner contributions at both 
aggregate and national levels. The MWU test shows that the differences between the 
values of Italy–UK and Foreigner treatments are not significant in either the Italian 
(p=0.91) or the British cases (p=0.35)18. We summarize the result as follows: 
 
Observation 3. In heterogeneous group treatments, there is no evidence to 
support the presence of a country effect between Italian and British subjects. 
 
 
                                                 
18 As mentioned above, the Wilcoxon Signed-Rank test shows that Britons contribute more than Italians 
when within the Foreigner treatment, whereas there was no difference within the Italy-UK treatment. 
This can be interpreted as country effect. However, comparing across treatments, there is no country 
effect in the sense that Britons do not contribute more in Foreigner treatment than in Italy-UK treatment. 
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Figure 3: British Behaviour across Treatments 
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4.2 Regression Analysis 
To quantify the effects detected by the non-parametric tests above, we run a 
statistical analysis of individual contributions to the public good as the dependent 
variable.19 Table 2 displays the results of the regressions. Explanatory variables include 
the time trend (Trend) and some dummy variables for treatments Foreigner and Italy–
UK, for the country of subjects’ origin (UK) and an interaction variable (Italy–UK*UK) 
between the Italy–UK and UK dummies to account for the behaviour of British subjects 
playing in heterogeneous groups and knowing the nationality of their group members. 
                                                 
19 The contributions to the public good are expressed in terms of the absolute number of tokens allocated 
to the public good. 
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We apply a random effects model with groups-clustering and White (1980) robust 
standard errors to our data in order to obtain panel data estimates.20 
Table 2 shows the different regression models we estimate by sequentially 
introducing the explanatory variables. We notice that results shown by the four 
regressions are robust in terms of sign, magnitude and statistical significance of 
coefficients. Thus, we discuss the results coming from the complete regression model, 
which confirm all the findings described in the previous section. First, the UK dummy 
is significant at the 1 percent level in the first regression, whereas it increases to the 5 
percent level in the last two regressions. Its coefficients are positive, although not very 
large (from 0.43 in the first regression to 0.37 in the last two regressions). This confirms 
observation 1, reporting that British subjects, on average, contribute more than Italians.  
Second, the individual contribution levels are significantly and negatively 
affected by being in a heterogeneous group. In our regression, both Italy–UK and 
Foreigner dummies capture the effects of being in a heterogeneous group. Across the 
regression models, the Foreigner coefficient remains constant (-0.87), while the Italy–
UK coefficient slightly increases in the last two models (from -1.01 in the first two 
regressions to -1.14 in the last two regressions). Both coefficients show that being in 
heterogeneous groups decreases, on average, individual contributions to the public good 
by one token. Figures 2 and 3 show that the values for both national samples of Italy–
                                                 
20 To test the robustness of our result, when compared with an alternative specification such as the fixed 
effects model, we perform the Hausman specification test in order to test the null hypothesis of no 
systematic difference in coefficients between the two models. The test fails to reject the null hypothesis 
(χ2=0.07). We also adopted different specifications of our regression in order to test the robustness of the 
results. Thus, we run both an OLS regression with group clustering and a censored Tobit. Regardless of 
the specification used, our results proved to be robust in terms of sign, magnitude and statistical 
significance of the coefficients. 
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UK and Foreigner treatments are almost always below the Native treatment ones.21 
Thus, observation 2 is confirmed by the regression results.  
Interestingly, we cannot differentiate between the influences of these two 
dummies given that their coefficients are not significantly different according to the 
Wald test (p=0.70). This matches the result reported in observation 3 stating that further 
information on the nationality of foreign group members does not affect the 
contribution levels. In fact, in neither national sample are there significant differences 
between the patterns of contribution in Italy–UK and Foreigner. The interaction 
variable between the UK and Italy–UK dummies (Italy–UK*UK) introduced in the last 
two regression models turns out to be always insignificant, showing that the British 
subjects do not behave differently from the Italian subjects when they play in 
heterogeneous groups.  
Finally, we test the influence of the time trend on individual decisions to 
contribute to the public good. The last regression shown in table 2 reports this effect to 
be highly significant and negative. Given the length of ten periods, the Trend coefficient 
implies a reduction of almost two tokens (-0.18). Thus, approaching the end of the 
experiment, we observe a constant decline in the contributions to the public good.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
21 The first and last period values of the British sample in the Foreigner treatment constitute the only 
exceptions.  
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Table 2: Regression - Dependent Variable: Individual Contribution to the Public Good  
Explanatory 
Variables 
Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient Coefficient 
Constant 3.28*** 
(0.31) 
3.07*** 
(0.32) 
3.10*** 
(0.32) 
4.07*** 
(0.33) 
Foreigner -0.87** 
(0.42) 
-0.87** 
(0.42) 
-0.87** 
(0.42) 
-0.87** 
(0.42) 
Italy–UK -1.01*** 
(0.42) 
-1.01*** 
 (0.42) 
-1.14*** 
 (0.44) 
-1.14*** 
 (0.44) 
UK - 0.43*** 
(0.11) 
0.37** 
(0.16) 
0.37** 
(0.15) 
Italy–UK*UK - - 0.12 
(0.22) 
0.12 
(0.22) 
Trend - - - 
 
-0.18*** 
(0.02) 
R2 0.049 0.061 0.061 0.122 
N 1360 1360 1360 1360 
The symbol ** indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 5% level. 
The symbol *** indicates that the coefficient is significant at the 1% level. 
The standard errors are robust (White, 1980).  
 
 
 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
The primary aim of this paper is to shed light on the role of cross-cultural 
interactions on economic decisions from an experimental point of view. We focus on 
interactions between Italian and British subjects on contributions to public goods. Our 
work proposes two novelties in the field of cross-country experiments. First, we 
conducted the experiments in real time in Italy and UK allowing the subjects to interact 
simultaneously without the intervention of the experimenters. Second, we controlled for 
the presence of a country effect between Italy and UK by allowing subjects to play in 
heterogeneous groups without any further information on the nationality of foreign 
members.  
The design allowed us to test two hypotheses. The first hypothesis investigates 
whether Britons cooperate less than Italians when playing in the Native treatment. In 
contrast to BH, we showed that British subjects contribute significantly more than 
Italians. In addition, there were no differences in the contribution levels between the 
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national samples in the Italy–UK treatment, but we found significant differences in the 
Foreigner treatment. These results are confirmed by the panel data estimates of our 
random effects model with groups-clustering and White (1980) robust standard errors 
run on the whole dataset.  
The second hypothesis states that subjects playing in heterogeneous groups 
contribute less than those in homogeneous groups. The data clearly confirmed this 
hypothesis. Our result is in line with other experimental studies (Fershtman and 
Gneezy, 2001; Carpenter and Cardenas, 2004; Willinger et al., 2004; Chuah et al., 
forthcoming), showing the effects of heterogeneous groups on individual interactions. 
Moreover, we provide support for the role played by cultural and social differences on 
cooperative behaviour, as described by several works (Sherif, 1966; Tajfel and Turner, 
1979; McPherson et al., 2001; Ruffle and Sosis, 2004;).  
In addition to the previous hypotheses, we checked for whether participants in 
the Italy–UK treatment contributed less than those in the Foreigner treatment. In other 
words, there may have been a “country effect” due to the existence of specific attitudes 
of British and Italian subjects towards each other. We did not find any evidence in 
support of this phenomenon. By comparing the group contributions made in Italy–UK 
and Foreigner treatments, no significant difference came out from the data.  
In conclusion, our experimental findings indicate that more attention should be 
devoted to the investigation of the effects of cultural interactions on economic 
decisions. The role of culture in an economic context has been widely explored, but the 
effect of the relations between subjects from different countries remains a complex 
issue.  
 
 24
References 
 
Adler, N.J., Graham, J.L., 1989. Cross-cultural interaction: the international 
comparison fallacy? Journal of International Business Studies 20(3), 515-537. 
Altman, M., 2001. Culture, human agency, and economic theory: culture as a 
determinant of material welfare. Journal of Socio-Economics 30, 379-391. 
Becker, G.S., 1998. Accounting For Tastes. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA. 
Bouchner, S., Perks, R.W., 1971. National role evocation as a function of cross-cultural 
interaction. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 2, 157-164. 
Bouchner, S., Ohsako, T., 1977. Ethnic role salience in racially homogenous and 
heterogenous societies. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 8, 477-492. 
Burlando, R., Hey, D.J., 1997. Do Anglo-Saxons free-ride more? Journal of Public 
Economics 64, 41-60. 
Brandts, J., Saijo T., Schram, A., 2004. How universal is behavior? A four country 
comparison of spite and cooperation in voluntary contribution mechanisms. 
Public Choice 119, 381-424. 
Camerer, C.F., 2003. Behavioral Game Theory. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
NJ. 
Carpenter, J., Cardenas, J.C., 2004. An inter-cultural examination of cooperation in the 
commons. Unpublished manuscript. 
Cason, T.J., Saijo T., Yamato, T., 2002. Voluntary participation and spite in public 
good provision experiments: an international comparison. Experimental 
Economics 5, 133-153. 
Chuah, S-H., Hoffman, R., Jones, M., Williams, G. 2006. Do cultures clash? Evidence 
from cross-national ultimatum game experiments. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization forthcoming. 
Croson, R., Buchan, N., 1999. Gender and culture: international experimental evidence 
from trust games. American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings 89, 386-
391. 
Davis, D.D., Holt, C.A., 1993. Experimental Economics. Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ. 
Eckel, C., Wilson, R. K., 2006. Internet cautions: experimental games with internet 
partners. Experimental Economics 9, 53-66. 
Fershtman, C., Gneezy U., 2001. Discrimination in a segmented society: an 
experimental approach. Quarterly Journal of Economic 116(1), 351-377. 
Fukuyama, F., 1995. Trust: the Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity. Free 
Press, New York. 
Gaechter, S., Herrmann, B., Thoeni, C., 2003. Understanding determinants of social 
capital: cooperation and informal sanctions in a cross-societal perspective. 
Mimeo. 
Gerxhani, K., Schram, A., 2006. Tax evasion and the source of income: a comparative 
experimental study. Journal of Economic Psychology fortcoming. 
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P., Zingales, L., 2004. Cultural biases in economic exchange. 
NBER Working Paper Series 11005. 
Harrison, L.E., Huntington, S.P., 2000. Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human 
Progress. Basic Books, New York. 
 25
Henrich, J., Boyd, R., Bowles, S., Camerer, C., Fehr, E., Gintis, H., McElreath, R., 
2001. In search of homo economicus: behavioral experiments in 15 small-scale 
societies. American Economic Review 91, 73-78. 
Hofstede, G., 1996. Cultures and Organizations. Software of the Mind. McGraw-Hill, 
New York, NY. 
Inglehart, R., 2000. Culture and Democracy. In: Harrison, L.E., Huntington, S.P. (Eds.), 
Culture Matters. How Values Shape Human Progress. Basic Books, New York, 
pp. 80-97. 
Ivanova-Stenzel, R., 2001. Auctions and fair division games – a cross-country bidding 
experiment. Journal of Socio-Economics 30, 367-374. 
Kachelmeier, S., Shehata, M., 1992. Culture and competition: a laboratory market 
comparison between China and the West. Journal of Economic Behavior and 
Organization 19, 145-168. 
Knack, S., Keefer, P., 1997. Does social capital have an economic payoff? A cross-
country investigation. Quarterly Journal of Economics 112(4), 1251-88. 
Ledyard, J.O., 1995. Public Goods: a survey of experimental research. In: Kagel, J.H., 
Roth, A.E. (Eds.), Handbook of Experimental Economics. Princeton University 
Press, Princeton, NJ, pp. 111-194. 
McPherson, M., Smith-Lovin, L., Cook, James, M., 2001. Birds of a feather: homophily 
in social networks. Annual Review of Sociology 27, 415-445. 
Munier, B., Zaharia, C., 2002. High stakes and acceptance behavior in ultimatum 
bargaining games: experimental evidence from France and Romania. Theory 
and Decision 53(3), 187-207. 
Ockenfels, A., Weimann, J., 1999. Types and patterns: an experimental East-West-
German comparison of cooperation and solidarity. Journal of Public Economics 
71, 275-287. 
Oosterbeek, H., Sloof, R., Kuilen van de, G., 2004. Cultural differences in ultimatum 
game experiments: evidence from meta-analysis. Experimental Economics 7, 
171-188. 
Putnam, R., 1993. Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy. 
Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ.  
Richerson, P.J., Boyd R., 2005. Not by Genes Alone. How Culture Transformed 
Human Evolution. The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London. 
Roth, A.E., Prasnikar, V., Okuno-Fujiwara, M., Zamir, S., 1991. Bargaining and market 
behaviour in Jerusalem, Ljubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study. 
American Economic Review 81(5), 1068-1095. 
Ruffle, B.J., Sosis, R., 2004. Cooperation and the in-group-out-group bias: a field test 
on Israeli kibbutz members and city residents. Journal of Economic Behavior 
and Organization forthcoming. 
Sherif, M., 1966. Group Conflict and Co-operation: Their Social Psychology. 
Routledge and K. Paul, London.  
Tajfel, H., Turner, J.C., 1979. An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In: Worchel, 
S., Austin, W.G. (Eds.), The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations. Nelson-
Hall, Chicago, pp. 7-24. 
White, H., 1980. A heteroskedasticity-constant covariance matrix estimation and a 
direct test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48(4), 817-830. 
Willinger, M., Keser, C., Lohman, C., Usunier, J.-C., 2003. A comparison of trust and 
reciprocity between France and Germany: experimental investigation based on 
the investment game. Journal of Economic Psychology 24, 447-466. 
 26
Appendix: Subjects Instructions for the Italy–UK Treatment  
 
INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
Welcome to our Experiment 
 
 
You are participating in an experiment about individual decision-making. You will be 
assigned to a group of four people and each group will be formed by two British 
subjects and two Italian subjects. You will play in the same group throughout the 
experiment. It will not be possible to distinguish between the British based members 
and the Italian based members of your group. 
 
The instructions are simple. According to your decisions and to the decisions made by 
the other members of your group, you can earn a considerable amount of money. The 
money you will earn will be paid to you, in cash, at the end of the experiment. The 
funds for this study have been provided by the Royal Holloway College. 
 
If any of the instructions are unclear, or if you have any questions, please attract the 
attention of the experimenter by raising your hand. Please do not communicate with any 
other participant from now on. 
 
 
The Experiment 
 
 
This experiment consists of 10 decision rounds.  
 
The amount of money you can earn will depend on the decision that you and the other 3 
members of your group make. Your profit will be measured in Experimental Currency 
(EC) and, at the end of the experiment, changed into pounds at the following exchange 
rate: 1 EC = £0.14 (for the Italian players the exchange rate is 1 EC = €0.20).  
 
In each decision round, you and the other 3 members of your group will be given 6 
tokens each. Each player will be choosing how to allocate his/her tokens between two 
options: Project A and Project B. These will now explained in turn. 
 
Project A 
 
Each token you allocate to the Project A will earn you 1 EC. 
 
Example.  
 
Suppose you put 3 tokens in the Project A. Then your earnings would be 3 EC from the 
Project A. 
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Project B 
 
Your earnings from Project B will depend on the total number of tokens that you and 
the other 3 members of your group allocate to Project B.  
 
Every token in the Project B will earn 0.40 EC for every member of the group, not just 
the member who allocated it. 
 
Example.  
 
Suppose you decided to put 3 tokens into the Project B and the other three members of 
your group allocate a total of 12 tokens to the Project B. This makes a total of 15 
tokens.  
 
Your earnings from the Project B would be 15*0.40EC=6 EC. The other three members 
of your group would also earn 6 EC from the Project B. 
 
 
To Summarize: 
 
In each decision round you will earn: 
 
1 EC times the number of tokens you allocate to Project A PLUS 0.4 EC times the total 
amount of tokens allocated to Project B by everyone in your group. 
 
 
After each decision round, you will be able to see your earnings from that round on the 
screen. You will also be told the total number of tokens that your group invested in 
Project B. You will not be able to know the individual decisions or earnings of any of 
the other participants.  
 
 
 
If you have any more questions, please ask them before the experiment begins. 
 
GOOD LUCK! 
 
 
 
